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Abstract: Managing capital flows and liquidity demand have been central issues for 
emerging market countries. This paper analyzes the effects of financial development and 
capital flows on foreign reserve accumulation in East Asian economies. Using annual data 
from 12 Asian economies between 1980 and 2009, the empirical results suggest that 
financial development can reduce a central bank‟s motivation to hoard foreign reserves by 
reducing the impact of capital flows on foreign reserve demand. Based on the empirical 
observations, this study then constructed a simple model of foreign reserve accumulation 
in which the optimal level of foreign reserves depends on the level of financial 
development. With an asymmetric preference in exchange rate, the actual level of foreign 
reserves held by a central bank is usually higher than the optimal level of foreign reserves 
needed for liquidity supply. 
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1. Introduction 
 
„…Following the Asian crisis of the late 1990s, it was likely that countries might choose to 
build up large foreign exchange reserves in order to be able to act as “do it yourself” lender 
of last resort in US dollars.‟ 
Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England (2006, p.5) 
 
As emerging market economies are engaged in trade and often seek external finance to 
boost domestic capital accumulation, capital inflows into these economies are inevitable. 
With the growing global financial integration, the rapid growth of foreign reserves in 
emerging market economies over the past two decades has posed important questions for 
scholars and policy makers. What has driven such rapid foreign reserve accumulation? Are 
current levels of foreign reserves justified by economic fundamentals?  What are the 
impacts of such rapid foreign reserve accumulation on global patterns of exchange rates, 
capital flows, and interest rates? 
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Emerging market economies have been observed to hoard foreign reserves to 
unprecedented levels. Since the early 1990s, while the average ratio of reserves to GDP in 
developed economies has remained steady at around 4 percent, the average reserve ratio in 
Asian and some other emerging market economies has risen from 4 percent to over 20 
percent of GDP (Jeanne 2010). East Asian economies, for instance, have accumulated a large 
amount of foreign reserves, which were only USD 0.7 trillion before the Asian crisis in 
1997, but rose nine-fold to around USD 6 trillion in 2010
2
. This amount is more than half 
the total global foreign reserves. 
 
Against this backdrop, three major motives behind the rapid foreign reserve buildup are; 
precautionary self-insurance against a crisis (Aizenman & Lee 2008), mercantilism to 
stimulate growth (Dooley et al. 2004), and managing exchange rate volatility (Levy-Yeyati 
& Sturzenegger 2006). The precautionary motive is to build a „war chest‟ to buffer against 
both current and capital account shocks (e.g. Jeanne & Ranciere 2006; Caballero & 
Panageas 2008) as well as to serve as „do it yourself‟ lender of last resort after the 1997-
1998 Asian crisis (King 2006). The mercantilist motive is to keep a currency undervalued 
in order to promote export competitiveness, No single explanation, however, can account 
for the behavior of all countries at all times. In addition, the importance of each rationale 
may change over time (Ghosh et al. 2012). 
 
Despite a huge literature on foreign reserves, few studies have considered the role of an 
underdeveloped financial system in motivating foreign reserve accumulation among 
emerging market economies. Holmström and Tirole (1997; 2011) and Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (2001; 2004) highlight the role of government in providing liquidity in 
financially underdeveloped economies. These studies suggest that governments in emerging 
market economies may address a shortage in the domestic supply of low-risk and liquid 
assets by accumulating foreign reserves. Similarly, Mendoza et al. (2007) make a 
theoretical argument that the global imbalance can be the outcome of financial integration, 
when countries differ in financial markets depth, implying the role of financial 
underdevelopment in motivating foreign reserve accumulation. None of these studies, 
nonetheless, provide direct evidence on the dynamics among capital flows, financial 
development and foreign reserve accumulation. In addition, many theoretical studies (e.g. 
Aizenmen 2008; Aizenman & Lee 2008) on foreign reserve accumulation, although 
addressing each aspect individually, do not take into account other aspects such as „fear of 
appreciation‟, often noticed among emerging market economies.  
 
This paper attempts to fill this gap by examining the effects of financial development and 
capital flows on foreign reserve accumulation. Applying simple pooled regressions with 
annual data from 12 East Asian economies in the period 1980-2009, this study first 
examines the relationship between capital flows, financial development, and foreign reserve 
accumulation. A fixed-effect method and alternative measures of financial development are 
also employed to check the robustness of the estimations. The results consistently suggest 
that financial sector development reduces the precautionary motivation to hoard reserves. 
Second, based on the empirical results, this study constructs a theoretical model of foreign 
reserve accumulation, in which a central bank holds foreign reserves to supply liquidity in a 
financially underdeveloped economy. The theoretical model argues that with a low capacity 
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of the private sector to mobilize resources for the liquidity supply due to an underdeveloped 
financial market, the monetary authority plays a key role in supplying additional liquidity.  
This theoretical model shows that development of the financial system reduces a monetary 
authority‟s motivation to hoard foreign reserves for liquidity provision. The theoretical 
model used in this study also shows that with an asymmetric preference in exchange rate, 
the actual level of foreign reserves held by a central bank is usually higher than the optimal 
level of foreign reserves needed for liquidity supply. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, the analysis concentrates on 
East Asian economies which attract a large share of global capital flows. Cross-region 
studies usually overlook the characteristics of each region. Thus, focusing on Asia could 
provide an in-depth analysis of the region, which takes into account its special 
characteristics, such as export-orientation and „fear of appreciation‟.   
 
Second, the study formally takes into account the level of financial development in 
discussing foreign reserve demand and capital flows. This is an important departure from 
the existing literature on foreign reserve accumulation, which largely does not address how 
financial development could influence central bank‟s foreign reserve accumulation. This 
study provides empirical evidence that financial development matters to liquidity 
management and a central bank‟s behaviour in foreign reserve accumulation. 
 
Third, the theoretical model incorporates a monetary reaction with an asymmetric 
preference in the exchange rate and the concept of private and public liquidity provision. 
Although there are several motives for foreign reserve accumulation, most theoretical 
studies address only one of the three motives. At the same time, the empirical literature 
shows that foreign reserve accumulation is driven by a combination of the three motives. 
This study constructs a theoretical model that puts together the three motives, helping 
reconcile the gap between the theoretical models and empirical evidence in the literature. In 
addition, most of the theoretical studies focus on optimal level foreign reserves but are still 
puzzled by why countries hold more foreign reserves than the optimal levels, often 
suggested in the literature. This study incorporates „fear of appreciation‟ into the model, 
explaining why the actual level of foreign reserves in emerging market economies is 
usually higher than the optimal levels suggested by the literature.  
 
The next section describes recent trends in foreign reserve accumulation among Asian 
emerging market economies. Section 3 reviews the literature on foreign reserve 
accumulation and its nexus with capital flows and financial development. Section 4 shifts 
focus to the empirical investigation while Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 presents 
a model explaining the motives for foreign reserve accumulation and the role of the private 
sector in liquidity provision. Section 7 concludes and discusses some directions for further 
research.   
 
2. Recent trends in foreign reserve accumulation and capital flows in Asia 
 
Any observation of the pattern on capital flows and foreign reserve accumulation in East 
Asia is not complete without considering the 1997-1998 Asian crisis. As can be seen in 
Figure3.1, net private capital inflows have rebounded from the sharp capital reversal during 
the 1997-1998 Asian crisis. Furthermore, the current account balance had been consistently 
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negative before the financial crisis but became positive after the crisis. Accompanied by a 
surge in capital flows into the region, the current account surplus has provided an even 
larger source of foreign exchange for the massive foreign reserve accumulation.  
 
The rapid accumulation of foreign reserves in Asia began in the mid-1990s and has 
accelerated in recent years. Foreign reserve accumulation grew rapidly in the period 2002-
2007, at a pace three times more than that in the period 1999-2001. The accumulation rate 
of foreign reserves in the Asian region was only 2 percent of GDP in the period 1999-2001, 
but rose quickly to around 7 percent in the period 2005-2007. Central banks in East Asia, 
particularly China‟s central bank, accounted for the bulk of the build-up. Among foreign 
reserve accumulators, Asian economies are among the ten largest reserves holders: China, 
Japan, Taiwan, Korea, India, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia. The share of global 
foreign reserves held by Asian economies increased from 45 percent in 1995 to 66 percent 
in 2010. In addition, only a few monetary authorities hold an increasingly larger share of 
the reserve holding. China and Japan account for more than half the total world reserve 
accumulation. In terms of share of GDP (Figure 3), Hong Kong has accumulated the 
highest percentage of reserves to GDP (121 percent) followed by Singapore (106 percent), 
Taiwan (94 percent), Malaysia (50 percent), and China (49 percent). 
 
Figure 1 Current account balance, capital flows, and reserve accumulation in Asia 
(percent of total GDP) 
 
Note: Countries are all in Asia. 
Source: Author‟s calculation based on Balance of Payments Statistics, IMF(December 2010).  
 
 
In practice, there have been a number of „rules of thumb‟ for a country‟s appropriate level 
of foreign reserves. These rules include maintaining reserves of: (1) three to four months of 
imports to offset current account shocks; (2) 5-20 percent of broad money (M2) to be able 
to maintain confidence in the value of the domestic currency against capital flight (Calvo 
1996; Wijnholds et al. 2001); (3) the total amount of short-term external debt, known as the 
Greenspan-Guidotti rule (Rodrik & Velasco 1999; Garcia &Soto 2004). 
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Figure 2 Foreign reserves as share of GDP 
 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF (December 2010). Central Bank of the Republic of China 
(Taiwan) (December 2010). 
 
 
Figure 3 Level of foreign reserves in Asia and traditional benchmark 
 
 
Note: These Asian economies are China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam.  
Source: Author‟s calculation based on International Financial Statistics, IMF (December 2010).  
 
The Asian region as a whole seemed to follow these rules until the Asian crisis in 1997-
1998. As shown in Figure3.3, the level of foreign reserves, for example, was around five 
months of imports, just above the three-month rule. Similarly, the ratio of reserves to short-
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term external debt was just above one month as suggested by the Greenspan-Guidotti rule. 
Foreign reserves as a percent of broad money were within the 5-20 percent range.  
 
The pattern of foreign reserves, however, changed after the 1997-1998 Asian crisis. Based 
on the three traditional indicators, the current level of foreign reserves in emerging Asian 
economies may be substantially in excess. In the period 2009-2010, East Asian economies 
held around nine months of imports, three times higher than the three-month rule. The level 
of foreign reserves as a ratio to short-term external debt in the period 2008-2010 was 
around five, far above the level suggested by the Greenspan-Guidotti rule. In addition, the 
level of foreign reserves as a percent of broad money in the period 2008-2010 was around 
33 percent, which is above the 5-20 percent range suggested by the literature.  
 
This unprecedented reserve accumulation in several key Asian economies indicates that 
factors other than purely precautionary motives might be driving the rapid buildup of 
international reserves (Aizenman & Lee 2008). The evidence also suggests that limiting 
vulnerability has probably not been the primary motive for the recent foreign reserve 
buildup in these economies. Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001) argue that the old rule of thumb 
that reserves should be equivalent to three months of imports is obsolete and a different 
benchmark that takes into account capital flows is needed. The authors argue that the 
benchmark should consist of the sum of short-term debt (external drain) and an allowance 
for possible capital flight by domestic residents (internal drain), taking into account 
differences in country risks and exchange rate regime. An internal drain refers to a run from 
bank deposits to currencies while an external drain refers to a flight from the domestic 
currency to foreign currencies or banks (see Kaminsky & Reinhart 1999). The argument put 
forward by Winjholds and Kapteyne (2001) suggests the important role of financial 
integration and financial development, which is the central issue of this study.  
 
Nonetheless, determining the optimal level of foreign reserves is not straightforward as it is 
subjective to uncertainty and institutional factors such as degree of capital mobility, 
financial liberalization, or weaknesses in the domestic banking system. With financial 
globalization, the high volatility of capital flows complicates the conduct of monetary 
policy and exchange rate policy, and has impacts on an economy‟s ability, particularly an 
economy with an underdeveloped financial market, to deal with sudden capital inflows and 
outflows. Thus, this environment indeed influences the level of foreign reserves. 
 
3. Literature review 
 
Three major explanations stand out in the literature on foreign reserve demand: 
precautionary motives, mercantilist motives, and financial stability motives.  In the 
precautionary view, countries accumulate foreign reserves as self-insurance to avoid costly 
liquidation of long-term projects (Aizenman & Lee 2008), and to smooth domestic 
absorption as a cushion against sudden stops in capital inflows (Jeanne & Rancière 2006). 
In addition, countries can use international reserves to smooth the impact of capital flow 
volatility, to manage an adjustable-peg or managed-floating exchange rate regime 
(Frankel&Jovanovic 1981; Edwards 1984), and to stabilize output (Ben-Bassat & Gottlieb 
1992; Aizenman & Marion 2004; Garcia & Soto 2004; Jeanne & Ranciere 2006). Similarly, 
foreign reserves can be used to stabilize fiscal expenditure in countries with limited taxing 
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capacity and sovereign risks, and limited access to global capital markets (Aizenman & 
Marion 2004).  
 
In the mercantilist view, reserve accumulation is a result of a growth strategy which keeps 
exchange rates undervalued to stimulate export growth and competitiveness (Dooley et al. 
2004). Countries hold foreign reserves as „collateral‟ to encourage FDI. Similarly, foreign 
reserve accumulation can occur in the aftermath of a growth strategy that combines export 
promotion and credit subsidization, known as „financial mercantilism‟ (Aizenman & Lee 
2008). The development experience of East Asia suggests the prevalence of export 
promotion by preferential financing, which effectively  subsidizes investment in targeted 
sectors (Aizenman & Lee 2008). This promotion has been achieved in several ways: 
including through direct subsidies funded by state banks; or financial repression where 
favored sectors have enjoyed preferential access to cheaper external debt; or through „moral 
suasion‟ where private banks were encouraged to provide favorable financing.  
 
In the financial stability view, a major motivation of central banks to hold foreign reserves 
is to support the overall banking system and to insure against financial instability (Obstfeld 
et al. 2010). In this view, a financial shock is not simply a „sudden stop‟ in which case a 
country would need to hold foreign reserves only in proportion to its short-term external 
debt (Greenspan-Guidotti rule). With a vulnerability to portfolio shifts by domestic 
residents (internal and external drain), the monetary authority needs to hold reserves 
proportional to the size of its banking system.  
 
However, the importance of each motive may change over time. Ghosh et al. (2012) find 
that self-insurance against current account shocks was relatively important in the 1980s. 
They suggest that the motive to insure against capital account shocks becomes more 
important when emerging market economies become more financially integrated. In East 
Asia which relies more on export sectors, the mercantilist motive may have become more 
important over time while the precautionary motive was reinforced by the 1997-1998 Asian 
crisis.  
 
Apart from these three motives, other features of the domestic financial systems in 
emerging market economies may have played a role in Asia‟s reserve hoarding. The 
relatively underdeveloped local financial systems, for instance, create difficulties both in 
channeling domestic savings to investment and in diversifying capital resources to their 
most productive uses. In addition, the interaction between underdeveloped capital markets 
and an excess of domestic savings, driven either by a „saving glut‟ or low investment, gives 
an intermediary role to the central bank in accumulating „safe‟ assets (Mendoza et al.2007; 
William et al.2011).In other words, financial development should help channel domestic 
saving, which is often high in Asian emerging market economies, to domestic investment, 
and thereby reduce capital outflows.  
 
Capital flows, financial development and reserve accumulation 
The reserve accumulation by many emerging market economies seems to be an outcome of 
the integration of these economies into the global market. Most Asian economies have been 
major players in international trade but still have relatively underdeveloped financial 
systems. This asymmetry appears to be one of the reasons why emerging market economies 
hold a large share of world foreign reserves whereas mature economies, with complete and 
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deep financial markets, hold a relatively constant amount of foreign reserves (Pineau et al. 
2006).  
 
Box 1: Capital flows and reserve demand nexus 
 
 
This section connects the links between capital flows, reserve accumulation, and financial 
development. In one strand of the literature, capital flows can have an impact on economic 
performance and macroeconomic stability (Gruben & MacLeod 1998; Bosworth & Collins 
1999; Mody & Murshid 2005; Mileva 2008), which affects foreign reserve demand through 
at least three channels as can be seen in Box 1.  
 
First, capital flows affect foreign reserve demand due to concerns about increased output 
volatility associated with volatile capital flows. As experience of capital inflows in many 
countries shows, capital inflows are more often pro-cyclical than counter-cyclical 
(Kaminsky et al. 2004; Reinhart & Reinhart 2008; Mendoza & Terrones 2008). For 
instance, sudden changes in the direction of capital flows tend to induce or exacerbate 
boom-bust cycles in economies that lack a deep and well-functioning financial sector 
(Aghion et al. 2005; Caballero & Krishnamurthy 2001). In other words, increased capital 
flows tend to increase output volatility, which motivates more precautionary demand for 
foreign reserves to insure against output volatility.  
 
Second, capital inflows influence reserve demand through their appreciation impact on the 
real exchange rate and negative effects on the external competiveness of recipient 
economies (Corden 1993; Athukorala & Rajapatirana 2003). As Asian economies have a 
fear of appreciation (Pontines & Yongqiang 2010), central banks are induced to intervene 
in the foreign exchange market, often known as „leaning against the wind‟, accumulating 
foreign reserves when there is upward pressure on the exchange rate. One reason behind 
such an intervention could be that a fixed or relatively rigid exchange rate can provide 
benefits in terms of macroeconomic stability, particularly to a developing country, where 
financial development is limited and the capital market is closed. Rogoff et al. (2003) show 
that for countries at a relatively early stage of financial development, fixed or relatively 
stable exchange rate regimes appear to offer some anti-inflation credibility gains without 
compromising growth objectives. Rogoff et al. (2003) also suggest that because of 
institutional weaknesses and limited financial development, emerging market economies 
should only consider adopting more flexible exchange rate regimes if they develop 
economically and institutionally. On the other hand, based on a systematic panel data 
analysis of 83 countries for the period 1960-2000, Aghion et al. (2009) show that real 
 Capital Flows Exchange Rate 
Appreciation 
Output Volatility 
Vulnerability to Crisis 
Reserve demand 
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exchange rate volatility consistently reduces growth in countries with a relatively thin 
financial market. Part of the explanation for this is that financial stocks tend to be greatly 
amplified in financially underdeveloped economies. Therefore, foreign reserve 
accumulation is a result of intervening in foreign exchange markets or stabilizing the real 
exchange rate in the presence of volatile terms of trade shocks and potentially destabilizing 
capital flows.  
 
Third, capital inflows motivate foreign reserve demand as a result of an increased 
vulnerability to crises induced by capital inflows. As experience of the impact of capital 
inflows in emerging market economies shows, capital inflows drive up equity and asset 
prices (Grenville 2008; Schadler 2008), reduce the quality of assets, and can adversely 
affect the maturity and currency composition of the balance sheets of the private sector. In 
addition, real estate booms and asset price bubbles can amplify financial fragility and crisis 
risk, making the economy particularly vulnerable to financial shocks and crises (Reinhart & 
Rogoff 2009). Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) provide comprehensive historical evidence of 
capital flows, financial vulnerability, defaults, and crises. In many instances, borrowing 
countries may find it difficult to resist the temptation to take what is offered during good 
times and are typically of the „This time is different‟ syndrome (Reinhart & Rogoff 2009). 
Similarly, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show that, following a prolonged period of 
economic boom fuelled by capital inflows, crises often occur when an economy enters a 
recession. In this regard, foreign reserve buildup can also be associated with growing 
fragility of the banking system of a country, because concerns about financial stability lead 
countries to hoard foreign reserves for liquidity provision during shocks.  
 
In another strand of the literature, the financial sector is a crucial factor in the link between 
capital flows and their impact on reserve demand. In particular, the financial sector plays a 
central role in macroeconomic performance by reducing the impacts of capital flows on 
output volatility, real exchange rate appreciation, and financial vulnerability, all of which 
can motivate foreign reserve accumulation. Easterly et al. (2000) and Beck and Levine 
(2004) show that a more developed financial system is associated with lower output 
volatility across countries. Moreover, a deep and active financial sector can provide broad 
investment opportunities, direct capital inflows towards their most productive uses, 
mitigate investment demand constraints (Ötker-Robe et al. 2007), and thus reduce real 
exchange rate appreciation (Saborowski 2009). Finally, financial development has a large 
causal effect in the reduction of macroeconomic volatility as a result of liquidity provision 
by the financial sector (Raddatz 2006), which then requires less liquidity provision by the 
government (Caballero & Krishnamurthy 2001). Analyzing data on 70 manufacturing 
industries in 48 countries during the period 1981-1998, Raddatz (2006) shows that financial 
underdevelopment can significantly increase the relative volatility of sectors that typically 
need a large amount of liquid funds for their operation. In other words, financial 
development reduces volatility because it can help firms facing temporary cash flow 
(liquidity) or net worth problems (solvency) to obtain the necessary working capital.  
 
These two strands of the literature indicate that the three channels of transmission (i.e. 
output volatility, real exchange rate and financial fragility), through which capital flows 
affect foreign reserve demand, can be weakened by development of the financial sector.  
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On the other hand, underdeveloped financial markets and their interaction with large capital 
flows are shown to be more likely to contribute to financial stability risk (Bank of England 
2011). In particular, as countries with underdeveloped financial markets enter the early 
stages of financial liberalization, their economies can be vulnerable to a „sudden stop‟ in 
capital inflows. This vulnerability can be exacerbated if their domestic financial markets 
are underdeveloped but closely integrated with global financial networks (Durdu et al. 
2009). This concern will increase the demand for low-risk and liquid financial assets in 
order to insure as well as to mitigate output loss in the case of shocks (Mendoza et al. 
2007). In other words, the demand for low-risk and liquid assets increases because 
economic agents in financially underdeveloped economies have limited access to such 
assets and instruments that allow them to hedge risks. As often pointed out in the literature 
on „liquidity versus solvency‟, an economic agent‟s ability to withstand shocks cannot be 
supported by net wealth (solvency) alone, but by liquidity management also. With a 
shortage in the domestic supply of „safe‟ assets, emerging market economies turn to 
accumulating „safe‟ assets (foreign reserves) from advanced economies to address the 
shortage in the domestic supply of safe assets (Gourinchas et al. 2008). The relationship 
between a central bank‟s foreign reserves (safe assets) and capital flows is reinforced by the 
fact that many financially underdeveloped economies directly or indirectly impose 
restrictions on private capital outflows. In this case, foreign reserve accumulation is partly a 
reflection of the intermediary role played by the government to supply „safe‟ assets (Bank 
of England 2011).  
 
To summarize, capital inflows influence reserve demand with their volatility, potential 
destabilizing effects and the risk of sudden stops and reversals (Frankel 2010; Jeanne 2010; 
Kaminsky et al. 2004). In other words, capital inflows can have potentially adverse impacts 
on recipient economies, which motivates foreign reserve buildup. At the same time, given 
the important role of financial markets in mobilizing and allocating resources efficiently, 
financial development can help reduce the impact of capital flows on real exchange rate 
appreciation (Saborowski 2009), and lower output and macroeconomic volatility (Raddatz 
2006). These relations shape this study‟s hypothesis that the impact of capital flows on 
reserve demand could be reduced by development of deep financial markets and 
institutions.  
 
4. Empirical investigation 
 
This section turns to an empirical investigation of capital flows, financial development, and 
foreign reserve accumulation. Except for the interaction term, the specification here closely 
follows the specifications in the literature (e.g. Obstfeld et al. 2010; Aizenman & Lee 
2008). To ensure that the interaction term does not proxy for capital inflows or the level of 
financial development, the latter variables are included in the regression independently. The 
reduced form for the empirical study can be simplified as:  
 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑋𝑖𝑡 + i + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 
where 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the log value of foreign reserves over GDP in country i at time t, 
Capflows is the log value of capital inflows over GDP, Findev is financial development, 
and CapFin is the interaction term between capital flows and financial development. Xit is a 
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vector of control variables including GDP per capita, broad money, openness to 
international trade, exchange rate stability and financial openness. These are standard 
control variables in the literature.   is the country fixed-effects. The study also includes a 
dummy for the post Asian crisis period in order to capture potential differences in the 
foreign reserve accumulation patterns across countries between the pre- and post-Asian 
crisis period. 
 
The parameters of main interest are 3  and 4 , which capture the effects of financial 
development and the interaction of capital flows and financial development on foreign 
reserve accumulation, respectively. If financial development can reduce the impact of 
capital flows on foreign reserve accumulation, then 
4  should be negative and statistically 
significant. The coefficient of capital flows 
2 is expected to be positive and that of 
financial development 3 is expected to be negative.  
 
 
4.1 Explanatory variables 
 
In the literature, foreign reserve accumulation is explained by a number of motives 
including the self-insurance motive, mercantilism, the financial stability motive, and 
exchange rate management. The explanatory variables included in this study to capture 
these motives, except financial development and the interaction term, follow those in 
Obstfeld et al. (2010). The study uses annual data from 12 Asian economies during the 
period 1980-2009. The definitions and sources of the data are in the Appendix.  
 
Financial development (Findev) 
Financial development is a broad economic concept and there are various measures of 
financial development (see also, Beck et al. 2000). Each measure has its own strengths and 
limitations. Among all measures, the sum of domestic credit to the private sector and 
market capitalization is often used as an indicator of a country‟s level of financial 
development in terms of both size and depth. In this study, this standard measure is be used 
in the main regression and analysis.  
 
Also close to the concepts of financial development and a country‟s access to international 
finance, total external equity liability and debt liability as a share of GDP can be used as a 
proxy for financial development (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti 2003). The measure of financial 
market development, as the extent of external liabilities, is based on the assumption that 
countries with less developed domestic financial markets also have fewer external 
liabilities. One limitation of this measure, however, is that it might not be closely related to 
the capacity of the financial sector in risk management and information processing (King & 
Levin 1993). Alternatively, the total stock value traded and stock market capitalization is 
also often used as a measure of the financial market in terms of liquidity and size of the 
market respectively. Thus, these three alternative measures are used for robustness check of 
the results.  
 
Capital flows (Capflows) 
For capital flows, this study follows Mendoza (2010) by using a sum of the current account 
and net FDI inflows, scaled by GDP. This measure captures more the short-term 
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components of capital flows (hot money), considered to be volatile and potentially 
destabilizing. A negative value indicates the level of short-term flows needed to finance a 
current account deficit. A positive value might reflect a current account surplus and positive 
net FDI inflows. This indicator could be interpreted as a possible inducement for 
appreciation pressure on the currency, in which there would be a positive link to foreign 
reserve accumulation. 
 
GDP per capita (GDPPC) 
Foreign reserve holdings should increase with international transactions and the standard of 
living (Aizemen & Marion 2003). As GDP per capita is often used to reflect the standard of 
living, this study includes GDP per capita in the regressions. GDPPC is expected to be 
positively correlated to the foreign reserve accumulation. 
 
Broad money (M2/GDP) 
Broad money often indicates a country‟s exposure to the withdrawal of assets or resident-
based capital flight from the domestic currency. Following Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001), 
the Early Warning System literature, and the financial stability model presented by 
Obstfeld et al. (2010), this study uses broad money as a proxy for the financial stability 
motive for foreign reserve accumulation. Obstfeld et al. (2010) argue that broad money 
supply is the most appropriate measure to serve as an indicator of the potential need for 
foreign reserves, given the potential run out of domestic currency deposits and potential 
capital flight. It is also a measure of the potential need for bank support in or after a crisis, 
given a central bank‟s role of lender of last resort. In this regard, broad money is expected 
to be positively linked to reserve accumulation.  
 
Trade (trade/GDP) 
International trade requires foreign reserves for transactions. A conventional rule of thumb 
by practitioners is that a country should hold a level of foreign reserves that is enough to 
finance three to four months of imports, without income flows. For this reason, a country 
may hold foreign reserves because of a precautionary motive for foreign reserve demand 
and for self-insurance. Therefore, the ratio of imports over GDP is expected to be positively 
linked to foreign reserve accumulation. 
 
Financial Openness 
Greater financial openness suggests vulnerability to external financial shocks, and is 
expected to increase the precautionary demand for reserves. Among the many measures of 
financial openness, this study uses the Chinn-Ito Index. A higher value signals a higher 
degree of openness to financial transactions.  
 
Exchange Rate Volatility 
Greater exchange rate flexibility should reduce the demand for foreign reserves as a central 
bank no longer needs a large foreign reserve stockpile to manage a fixed exchange rate 
(see, for example, Aizenman & Marion 2003). In other words, exchange rate fluctuations 
within a certain range would result in less government intervention in the foreign exchange 
market, and thus less foreign reserve buildup. However, greater real exchange rate volatility 
is empirically shown to have a link to lower growth and financial instability, particularly in 
financially underdeveloped countries (Rogoff et al. 2003; Hviding et al. 2004). Thus, this 
variable is expected to be positively linked to foreign reserve holding.   
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4.2 Concern on outliers 
 
Given the nature of foreign reserves across the Asian region, one might have a concern that 
China and Japan could be the outliers in the sample and thus could affect the results.  To 
address this potential concern, the study first examines the sample with scatter plots. As 
shown in Figure 3.4, the data for Japan are far from the fitted values in the scatter plot 
between foreign reserves (Reserves/GDP) and broad money (M2/GDP). However, the 
variables foreign reserves, trade, capital inflows, and GDP per capita do not produce any 
serious outliers. China seems not be an outlier in this study. Thus, Japan will be dropped 
from the sample size to check the robustness of the results.  
 
Figure 3.4 Scatter plots of foreign reserves, trade, M2, Capital inflows, and GDPPC 
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5. Regression results and analysis 
 
Table 3.1 reports the results of the regressions with a log of reserve accumulation over GDP 
as the dependent variable. Column 1 shows the result of the simple pooled regressions 
while columns 2, 3, and 4 report the results of the robustness checks with country-fixed 
effects, year fixed effects, and country and year fixed effects, respectively.   
 
In the simple pooled OLS (column 1), no fixed effects are allowed and the standard errors 
allow for clustering within countries. An unstructured serial correlation is allowed in the 
error term within countries. Column 1 is a between-group panel estimation, so serial 
correlation in no way affects the results or generates spurious-regression effects. In this 
estimation, most variables, except for financial openness and financial development, have 
the expected sign and are statistically significant. The coefficient on financial development 
is negative as expected but is not significant. At the same time, the coefficient on the 
interaction term is negative and statistically significant, as expected.  
 
Column 2 introduces the country-fixed effects, in which all cross-sectional means are 
removed. In this regard, there is only „within‟ identification, not „between‟ identification.  
Thus, the coefficients in column 2 are estimates of all the variables from the time-series 
variation within the country units. R
2 
improves in the country-fixed effect estimation and 
the coefficients of trade and capital flows become slightly weaker.  The interaction term 
remains negative and statistically significant.  
 
Column 3 introduces year-only fixed effects and produces similar results to that of the 
pooled OLS in column 1. The fit is only slightly improved. The coefficients of the 
interaction remain negative and significant and do not change by a large or statistically 
significant amount.  
 
Column 4 includes both year and country fixed effects. In this specification, capital flows 
and the interaction term remain negative and statistically significant. The coefficients of 
financial development still have the expected sign but are statistically insignificant. At the 
same time, financial development is positive as in the country-fixed effect estimation and is 
statistically significant.   
 
In the four regressions, the coefficients on trade, capital inflows, and the interaction term 
between capital flows and financial development have the expected sign and are 
statistically significant. These results confirm the hypothesis that financial development can 
reduce foreign reserve accumulation by reducing the impact of capital flows on foreign 
reserve demand, induced by macroeconomic effects. The implication here is that although 
capital inflows could motivate foreign reserve accumulation, a well-functioning financial 
system could help reduce the impact of capital flows on foreign reserves hoarding. In other 
words, the magnitude of the impact of capital flows on foreign reserve demand decreases 
with a higher level of financial development due to efficient absorption of the capital 
inflows.  
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Table 1 Regression results (reserves/GDP in log as dependent variable) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
OLS FE FE FE 
LogGDPPC -0.094 -0.182 -0.114 -0.566 
 
(0.032)** (0.104) (0.036)*** (0.125)*** 
Log(M2/GDP) 0.653 0.425 0.633 -0.116 
 
(0. 221)** (0.358) (0. 238)** (0.462) 
Log(trade/GDP) 0.715 1.301 0.683 1.339 
 
(0.078)*** (0. 283)*** (0.084)*** (0.541)** 
Exchange rate 
volatility -3.919 -2.544 -4.506 -1.888 
 
(1.627)** (1. 297)* (2.328)* (1.691) 
Post Crisis 0.468 0. 258 
  
 
(0.155)** (0. 202) 
  Financial Openness -0.015 0.076 0.000 0.115 
 
(0.04) (0.089) (0.038) (0.086) 
Capital Inflows 2.856 4.321 2.523 2.654 
 
(0.591)*** (1.992)* (0.692)*** (1.389)* 
Findev1 -0.035 0.321 -0.051 0. 205 
 
(0.081) (0.097)*** (0.094) (0.098)* 
Interaction Terms 
(CapFin1) -0.651 -1.187 -0.59 -0.775 
 
(0. 204)*** (0.336)*** (0. 214)** (0. 266)** 
Constant -2.539 -4.143 -1.855 -0.839 
 
(0.670)*** (1.773)** (0.924)* (2.595) 
Country fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Year fixed effect No No Yes Yes 
Observations 242 242 242 242 
R-squared 0.85 0.91 0.883 0.93 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses.  The symbols ***, ** and, * 
indicate statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. Financial 
Development 1 (FinDev1) is the sum of domestic credit and market capitalization over GDP. 
 
 
The coefficients of financial development deserve further discussion. The coefficients of 
financial development in columns 1 and 3 have a negative sign as expected but are not 
statistically significant. On the contrary, the coefficients of financial development in 
columns 2 and 4 have a positive sign and are statistically significant. An explanation for 
these contrasting results lies in the measurement of financial development. As financial 
development (Findev1) is the sum of domestic credit and market capitalization over GDP, it 
measures size and depth and does not perfectly proxy for the capacity of resource 
mobilization, which is the focus of this study. Given this limitation and that this measure 
partly reflects the size of the market, it is not surprising that the coefficient can be positive. 
In addition, these positive and statistically significant coefficients of financial development 
on foreign reserve demand confirm the financial stability motive by which countries hoard 
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foreign reserves accordingly to the size of their financial market. As Obstfeld et al. (2010) 
argue, countries hoard foreign reserves partly to support the overall financial system and 
also to insure against financial instability.  
 
On the other hand, the findings on trade, capital flows, and the interaction term appear to be 
quantitatively important. In a country and year fixed-effect estimation (column 4), for 
example, when the ratio of trade over GDP rises by 10 percent, the ratio of foreign reserves 
over GDP would increase by 13 percent (between 7-13 percent in all regressions).  Based 
on the estimates, a 10 percent point increase in the capital flow ratio would lead to around a 
26 percent increase in the ratio of foreign reserves to GDP. This effect is reasonably high, 
and can be observed in some Asian economies. In the sample in this study, the average 
capital inflow is 4 percent while the average increase in the foreign reserves-to-GDP ratio is 
14 percent.  
 
To estimate how important financial development is in reducing the impact of capital flows 
on foreign reserve demand, one can ask the hypothetical question of how much reserve 
demand is reduced by a unit increase in financial development. Based on the results in 
column 4 of Table 3.1, one can determine the threshold level of financial development 
around which the effects of capital flows on foreign reserve accumulation could be 
neutralized. To do this, one can differentiate the model with respect to capital flows and set 
the first order condition to zero: 
 
∂𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠
∂𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠
= 2.65 − 0.775 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣 
  
The threshold level of financial development is around 3.42, which is equivalent to 342 
percent of GDP in terms of domestic credit and market capitalization. This is indeed a high 
level of financial development. In this study, only Hong Kong and Japan have such a level 
of financial size and depth. Nonetheless, the threshold itself is not important. Rather, a 
significant implication is that high level financial sector development reduces the impact of 
capital flows on foreign reserve accumulation.  
 
One also observes that exchange rate fluctuation has a negative sign in all the regressions, 
but is significant only in the first three regressions. This result seems to support the 
argument that exchange rate fluctuations within a certain range (flexibility) could cushion 
against capital inflows (Combes et al. 2011), which leads to less government intervention in 
the foreign exchange market, and thus less reserve buildup. 
 
Robustness check 
To conduct robustness checks, the study first drops Japan from the sample due to the 
suspicion of outliers, as discussed in Section 3.4.2. The results reported in Table 3.2 show 
that the estimations, using the sample without Japan, are not substantially different from the 
earlier findings. The coefficients of the interaction term have a negative sign and remain 
statistically significant. Similarly, the coefficients of broad money, trade, capital flows, and 
post-crisis dummy do not substantially change and remain statistically significant. 
Therefore, the results in this study do not suffer from outliers or influential observations.  
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In addition, this study uses access to international financial resources (FinDev2), domestic 
market liquidity (FinDev3), and market size (FinDev4) as alternative proxies of financial 
development and resource mobilization by the private sector. Access to international 
financial resources is measured by external equity liability and debt liability as a share of 
GDP. Market liquidity is captured by the total stock value traded over GDP. Market size is 
measured by the market capitalization of listed companies over GDP.  
 
The results are reported in Tables 2, 3, and 4.  In these tables, all the interaction terms 
between capital flows and financial development have a negative sign and remain 
statistically significant. The results confirm the hypothesis that financial development 
reduces the impact of capital flows on foreign reserve accumulation. Based on the results, a 
10 percent increase in financial development would reduce the impact of capital flows on 
reserve accumulation by between 7 and 11 percent. It should be noted that when financial 
development is measured as the ability to have access to international finance, the 
coefficients of financial development, as shown in Table 3, are all negative although they 
are not statistically significant. 
 
Table 2 Robustness check (excluding Japan) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS FE FE FE 
     
LogGDPPC -0.059 -0.179 -0.081 -0.515 
 (0.021)** (0.089)* (0.016)*** (0.149)*** 
Log(M2/GDP) 0.703 0.794 0.698 0.319 
 (0.083)*** (0.317)** (0.065)*** (0.522) 
Log(trade/GDP) 0.423 1.242 0.423 1.321 
 (0.055)*** (0.362)*** (0.054)*** (0.634)* 
Exchange rate 
volatility 
-1.490 -2.580 -1.547 -1.885 
(1.109) (1.412)* (2.113) (2.101) 
Post Crisis 0.388 0.112   
 (0.140)** (0.186)   
Financial Openness 0.055 0.046 0.056 0.074 
 (0.019)** (0.088) (0.021)** (0.092) 
Capital Inflows 4.075 4.174 3.823 2.754 
 (0.771)*** (1.686)** (0.677)*** (1.353)* 
Findev1 0.103 0.201 0.076 0.115 
 (0.069) (0.065)** (0.066) (0.090) 
Interaction Terms 
(CapFin1) 
-0.964 -1.027 -0.905 -0.702 
 (0.262)*** (0.270)*** (0.228)*** (0.270)** 
Constant -2.003 -5.218 -1.544 -2.674 
 (0.496)*** (1.901)** (0.327)*** (2.466) 
Country fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Year fixed effect No No Yes Yes 
Observations 221 221 221 221 
R-squared 0.884 0.908 0.910 0.930 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses.  The symbols ***, ** and, * indicate 
statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. Financial Development 1 
(FinDev1) is the sum of domestic credit and market capitalization over GDP. The sample excludes Japan. 
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Table  3 Robustness check with access to international market 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
OLS FE FE FE 
LogGDPPC -0.066 0.175 -0.1 -0.123 
 
(0.04) (0.1) (0.042)** (0.161) 
Log(M2/GDP) 0.471 0.528 0.427 0.198 
 
(0.131)*** (0. 210)** (0.126)*** (0. 251) 
Log(trade/GDP) 0.814 0.683 0.774 0.701 
 
(0.110)*** (0. 217)*** (0.128)*** (0. 267)** 
Exchange rate 
volatility 
-3.598 -1.446 -3.979 -0.65 
(1.867)* (1.137) (2. 288) (1.08) 
Post Crisis 0.522 0.471 
  
 
(0.172)** (0. 217)* 
  Financial Openness 0.022 0.19 0.04 0. 204 
 
(0.051) (0.081)** (0.052) (0.066)** 
Capital Inflows 2.888 2.057 2.721 1. 245 
 
(0.858)*** (1.091)* (1.009)** (1.467) 
Fin. Development2 -0.052 -0.009 -0.08 -0.063 
 
(0.045) (0.064) (0.06) (0.082) 
Interaction 
term(CapFin2) 
-1.058 -1.094 -1.044 -0.987 
(0. 275)*** (0.361)** (0. 298)*** (0.412)** 
Constant -2.557 -4. 264 -1.683 -0.364 
 
(0.604)*** (0.674)*** (0.761)** (2.058) 
Country fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Year fixed effect No No Yes Yes 
Observations 322 322 322 322 
R-squared 0.85 0.91 0.871 0.93 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses The symbols ***, ** and, * 
indicate statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. Financial 
Development 2 is the sum of total equity liability and total debt liability over GDP. 
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Table  4 Robustness check with market liquidity(stock value traded over GDP) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
OLS FE FE FE 
LogGDPPC -0.113 -0.116 -0.138 -0.548 
 
(0.036)*** (0.109) (0.038)*** (0.120)*** 
Log(M2/GDP) 0.517 0.635 0.484 -0.044 
 
(0.157)*** (0.318)* (0.159)** (0.487) 
Log(trade/GDP) 0.65 1. 264 0.607 1.366 
 
(0.099)*** (0. 281)*** (0.095)*** (0.476)** 
Exchange rate 
volatility 
-3.858 -2.576 -4.477 -2.005 
(1.636)** (1. 296)* (2. 230)* (1.658) 
Post Crisis 0.484 0. 285 
  
 
(0.150)*** (0. 235) 
  Financial Openness -0.03 0.063 -0.022 0.104 
 
(0.045) (0.096) (0.044) (0.094) 
Capital Inflows 3 2.508 2.906 1.473 
 
(0.757)*** (1.88) (0.773)*** (1. 261) 
Fin. Development4 0.133 0. 245 0.137 0.139 
 
(0.114) (0.078)*** (0.117) (0.092) 
Interaction Terms 
(CapFin4) -1.108 -1.091 -1.115 -0.686 
 
(0.387)** (0.404)** (0.368)** (0.363)* 
Constant -1.685 -4.98 -0.881 -1. 24 
 
(0.524)*** (1.506)*** (0.661) (2.312) 
Country fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Year fixed effec No No Yes Yes 
Observations 246 246 246 246 
R-squared 0.85 0.902 0.881 0.93 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses The symbols ***, ** and, * 
indicate statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. Financial 
Development 4 is the ratio of market capitalization over GDP.  
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Table  5 Robustness check with market size (market capitalization over GDP) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
OLS FE FE FE 
LogGDPPC -0.107 -0.11 -0.126 -0.514 
 
(0.047)** (0.106) (0.048)** (0.100)*** 
Log(M2/GDP) 0.52 0.626 0.505 -0.104 
 
(0.175)** (0.343)* (0.172)** (0.433) 
Log(trade/GDP) 0.658 1.189 0.636 1.348 
 
(0.095)*** (0.302)*** (0.091)*** (0.472)** 
Exchange rate volatility -3.534 -2.407 -4.089 -1.646 
 
(1.735)* (1. 200)* (2.339) (1.644) 
Post Crisis 0.43 0. 275 
  
 
(0.145)** (0. 237) 
  Financial Openness -0.027 0.052 -0.02 0.093 
 
(0.051) (0.102) (0.049) (0.096) 
Capital Inflows 1.985 1.5 1.79 0.787 
 
(0.557)*** (1.353) (0.668)** (0.896) 
Fin.Developmentt3 0. 245 0. 291 0.186 0. 217 
 
(0.085)** (0.060)*** (0.100)* (0.059)*** 
Interaction Terms 
(CapFin3) 
-1.091 -1.029 -0.989 -0.684 
(0.316)*** (0. 278)*** (0.331)** (0. 261)** 
Constant -1.772 -4.587 -1.18 -1. 22 
 
(0.554)*** (1.751)** (0.634)* (2. 252) 
Country fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Year fixed effect No No Yes Yes 
Observations 247 247 247 247 
R-squared 0.847 0.903 0.877 0.93 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and, * 
indicate statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. Financial 
Development 3 is the ratio of total stock value traded over GDP. 
 
6. A simple model of reserve accumulation 
 
Based on the empirical observations in Section 3.5 and their implications, this section 
constructs a simple model of international reserve accumulation in a financially 
underdeveloped economy. Three works from different strands of the literature serve as a 
starting point for the theoretical argument in this study. Obstfeld et al. (2010) provide an 
excellent starting point for discussion on liquidity demand and foreign reserve 
accumulation, arguing that central banks would hold an optimal amount of foreign reserves 
equivalent to a potential liquidity demand, largely based on the size of the banking system. 
Obstfeld et al. (2010), however, do not consider the role of the financial sector in supply 
liquidity.  
 
In another strand of the literature, Holmström and Tirole (1998; 2011) and Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (2001; 2009) provide insightful analyses of the public and private supply of 
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liquidity in imperfect financial markets. These studies make a powerful argument that 
financial development and governments are both important for the supply of liquidity. With 
aggregate uncertainty, the private sector is not self-sufficient to provide liquidity. In this 
regard, the government can intervene actively to supply additional liquidity. One of the 
implications from Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001; 2009) is that a higher level of 
financial sector development, or a reduction in collateral constraints, could help the 
economic agents smooth a sudden stop or liquidity shocks among the economic agents in 
the private sector. 
 
On the other hand, Srinivasan et al. (2009) observe central banks‟ asymetric preference in 
exchange rate and the corresponding patterns of foreign reserve accumulation. They argue 
that part of foreign reserve accumulation in emerging market economies is explained by a 
central banks‟ preference for exchange rate stability or depreciation rather than 
„appreciation‟. This view is consistent with the argument onemerging market economies‟ 
fear of floating put forward by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2007) show that exchange rate policies have evolved towards an apparent „fear of floating 
in reverse‟ or „fear of appreciation‟ whereby interventions have been aimed at limiting 
appreciation rather than depreciation. The study by Pontines and Rajan (2011) also 
confirms the existence of asymmetry in the central bank‟s foreign exchange intervention,in 
response to currency appreciation versus depreciation, in India, Korea, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia. 
 
Each of these studies addresses different aspects of foreign reserve accumulation: financial 
development, and liquidity demand and supply. However, none of these studies fully 
explain the behavior of foreign reserve accumulation observed in many emerging 
economies. Therefore, based on these three works, the theoretical model in this study 
attempts to provide a more complete framework to analyze the relationship between the 
level of financial development, foreign reserve demand and liquidity concerns induced by 
capital flows. This theoretical model is also the first to incorporate a monetary reaction with 
asymmetric preference in the exchange rate and the dynamics of private and public 
liquidity provision to explain the behavior of foreign reserve accumulation.  
 
Following Holmström and Tirole (1998; 2011) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), 
the model takes into account the concept of private and public liquidity supply into an 
analysis of a financially underdeveloped economy for two main reasons. First, „liquidity‟ is 
linked to capital flows (capital account shocks) as in the case of a „sudden stop‟, capital 
flight, or capital outflows. An economy with an underdeveloped financial market may be 
vulnerable to a „sudden stop‟ in capital flow, which leads the monetary authority to hold 
more „safe‟ assets as a „war chest‟ to insure against immediate liquidity shocks.  Second, 
„liquidity‟, as opposed to „solvency‟ plays an essential role in the literature of financial 
crises (e.g. Diamond & Dybvig 1983; Diamond & Rajan 2005). An economy‟s or 
economic agent‟s ability to withstand shocks cannot be supported by net wealth alone. A 
country can still face major economic shocks if it faces immediate liquidity issues. In 
addition, as Mulder and Bussière (1999) show, higher liquidity can significantly decrease a 
countries‟ vulnerability to external shocks in the face of weak domestic fundamentals. 
Similarly, Krishnamurthy (2010) shows in a model of the amplification mechanism of 
financial shocks that liquidity provision by the central bank can alleviate a crisis.  
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In the case of liquidity demand shocks, domestic residents or firms can meet liquidity by 
issuing claims on their productive assets or by using a credit line (Holmström & Tirole 
1998).  When financial markets are not well developed enough to provide these options, 
however, the government may need to step in to supply additional liquidity. The 
underdeveloped financial market can be caused by collateral constraints (Caballero & 
Panageas 2005). Therefore, the buildup of foreign reserves is motivated by the 
government‟s role in supplying additional liquidity to domestic economic agents during a 
liquidity shock, i.e. a sudden stop or capital outflow, with the presence of an 
underdeveloped capital market which fails to fully meet a liquidity demand. This relation 
indicates that development of a deep and active financial market could bring at least three 
benefits. First, it can promote resource mobilization for more private liquidity provision. 
Second, as discussed in Section 3.3.2, financial development can reduce the impact of 
capital flows on macroeconomic and exchange rate volatility, and on vulnerability to 
financial crises.  Third, by providing more international access to global low-risk and liquid 
assets, financial development can help reduce a central bank‟s intermediary role in securing 
such assets. These three benefits, therefore, can reduce a state‟s motivation to hoard foreign 
reserves. 
 
The model begins with liquidity demand in the domestic economy as in Obstfeld et al. 
(2010). A shock or pessimistic view by some domestic agents on the economy drives the 
private sector‟s liquidity demand for a foreign currency3.  However, unlike Obstfeld et al. 
(2010) who do not consider the role of the private sector in liquidity supply, the private 
sector, including banks in this model, coordinates among themselves to supply liquidity 
(self-provision of liquidity) given their access to international financial markets and 
capacity for resource re-allocation
4
. Given the underdeveloped capital markets, however, 
the private sector‟s liquidity supply cannot fully offset the liquidity demand, which puts 
pressure on the exchange rate. The low level of financial sector development can be 
reflected through limited capacity to borrow from each other and limited capacity to borrow 
from foreign investors
5
. In addition, different from Obstfeld et al. (2010) in which the 
central bank sells foreign reserves passively to supply liquidity in response to liquidity 
demand, the central bank in this model intervenes to supply liquidity, based on a monetary 
reaction function with asymmetric preference in the exchange rate. This is an important 
departure from Obstfeld et al. (2010) as many emerging economies have a preference for 
exchange rate undervaluation or stability (e.g. Calvo & Reinhart 2002; Levy-Yeyati & 
Sturzenegger 2007). 
 
6.1 The private sector and liquidity demand 
 
The economy in the model consists of two typical periods, t and t+1. The exchange rate on 
date t+1 is expressed as: 
                                                 
3
This liquidity demand for foreign exchange can arise in the form of buying foreign assets or foreign 
investment by domestic investors in the normal case, or in the form of capital flow reversal or currency attack 
in a bad scenario.  
4Holmström and Tirole (2011) call private liquidity supply „inside liquidity‟, and government supply of 
liquidity „outside liquidity‟.  
5
 In the liquidity literature, this limited capacity is caused by domestic and international constraints (Caballero 
& Krishnamurthy 2001) or by the non-pledgeable part of income or assets. In other words, some proportion of 
agents‟ income stream or assets cannot be promised or pledged to investors/lenders. 
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  )(1 eet ,         (1)  
 
where e is the foreign currency price of the domestic currency
6
. θ reflects the future state of 
the economy. Higher values of θ indicate a more favorable state of the economy. Economic 
agents in the domestic economy have divergent views on the economic fundamentals that 
will materialize in period t+1. For a given θ, agent i expects that the fundamental will be 
θ+ε, where noise 
i  is uniformly distributed over the interval ],[   and 0 i . 
Domestic agents are all risk neutral and are indexed by i Є [0 1]. 
 
The model assumes that, in period t, there is a liquidity shock, i.e. a sudden stop or capital 
flow reversal, which increases the demand for foreign currency. For simplicity, foreign 
investors are assumed to be not willing to hold the home currency at any price. In this case, 
the exchange rate is determined by the exchange market, involving only the domestic 
private sector and home monetary authority. The model also assumes that domestic interest 
rates can be prevented, by the monetary authority, from fully offsetting any expected 
exchange-rate changes, or that an increase in interest rate per se is so damaging to financial 
stability that home residents discount them.  Transaction costs and gains from interest that 
could be potentially earned from a currency position are also ignored here for simplicity. In 
such circumstances, people fundamentally care about the exchange rate in period t+1, 
compared to the exchange rate in period t. If θ is very low, then the average market forecast 
is for continuing home currency weakness. However, domestic agents hold divergent views 
on how weak a currency will be. 
 
In this economy, domestic agents hold domestic perfectly liquid assets (i.e bank deposits), 
the size of which is proportional to total liquid assets lt in period t. Bank assets, in contrast, 
are illiquid
7
. Thus, if domestic agents liquidate their liquid assets, financial institutions can 
repay domestic residents, only if loans can be called in or financial resources have to be 
mobilized domestically or internationally to fully meet liquidity demand. Otherwise, the 
domestic monetary authority intervenes to supply the additional liquidity.  
 
Based on these assumptions, a domestic agent i would trade the home currency for a 
foreign currency if the home currency is expected to fall from its current level, or: 
 
tiit eeE  )()}/({ 1  .       (2) 
 
For a given date t, exchange rate et, the measure of agents such that  ,)( ti e  or 
,)/(   ti e  is: 
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1
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

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
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
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t
e
e
dx
t
        (3) 
 
Therefore, at date t, the liquidity demand for foreign exchange in terms of the home 
currency is: 
                                                 
6
A fall in e means depreciation of the home currency.  
7This asymmetry in asset liquidity is known in the literature as the bank business of providing „liquidity-
transforming service‟. 
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where  dtl  is the total demand for foreign exchange liquidity.  
 
6.2 The private supply of liquidity 
 
From here, the model departs from Obstfeld et al. (2010) by introducing private liquidity 
supply. Domestic financial institutions will coordinate to supply liquidity, whose amount 
depends on the capacity of the financial sector to mobilize resources domestically or 
internationally to meet the liquidity demand. As in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), 
liquidity supply of foreign exchange by the private sector is possible because an optimistic 
or „intact‟ agent can provide liquidity domestically or even borrow more from international 
investors, given their international collateral. In this regard, net aggregate liquidity demand 
is: 
,st
d
t ll           (5) 
where stl is aggregate liquidity supply,  coordinated by all private financial institutions.  
 
However, liquidity supply by the private sector cannot fully offset liquidity demand (
d
t
s
t ll  ) for a number of reasons. First, as in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) and 
Holmström and Tirole (1998; 2011), the private sector faces two constraints: limited 
borrowing capacity with respect to each other, and limited borrowing capacity from 
international investors. These constraints are due to the underdeveloped capital markets, in 
which there are information asymmetry and collateral constraints between firms, banks, or 
international investors. In other words, because income/assets cannot serve as collateral at 
their full values (i.e. loan to collateral ratio is less than one), the private sector‟s self-
provided supply of liquidity or „inside liquidity‟ is limited. Caballero and Krishnamurthy 
(2001) show that in the case of capital flight of foreign exchange (e.g. during panics), a fire 
sale of domestic assets would lead to a fall in asset prices, leading to tightened domestic 
and international collateral. This interaction would further reduce the private sector‟s 
capacity to supply liquidity of foreign exchange. A shortage of liquidity supply is worse 
when no agents or institutions are willing to supply liquidity during a panic.  
 
Let t , ,10  t capture the level of the financial sector‟s capacity to coordinate the 
liquidity supply of foreign exchange. It also represents the degree of development of the 
domestic financial markets and access to international markets. Thus, 
d
tt
s
t ll  . Eq.5 can 
be rewritten as: 
0)(
2
)1(  



 ttt
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t
d
t
el
ll                       (6) 
 
It should be noted that  𝜖 +
𝑒𝑡
𝛼
− 𝜃 ≥ 0 because ti e )(   and  i  is uniformly 
distributed over the interval ],[  . Eq.6 implies that level of financial development partly 
determines net liquidity demand. A higher capacity of financial markets to coordinate 
resources for liquidity supply would help offset liquidity demand. As in Caballero and 
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Krishnamurthy (2001) and Holmström and Tirole (1998; 2011), domestic and international 
constraints and a wedge of project/collateral valuations between borrowers and lenders 
often lead to a shortage of aggregate liquidity supply by the private sector. 
 
 
6.3 The public supply of liquidity and central bank’s reaction function 
 
With a shortage of privately provided liquidity supply, some sources of public liquidity are 
necessary. Put simply, insufficient liquidity provision by the private sector provides a role 
for government intervention to make up for the liquidity shortage. Bacchetta et al. (2012) 
further argue that in an economy where the private sector does not have complete access to 
external liquidity, it is optimal for the central bank to provide the additional liquidity.  
 
Following these arguments, the central bank is assumed to intervene in the foreign 
exchange market to minimize the following inter-temporal criterion: 
 
min
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐸𝑡 𝐿𝑡 + 𝛿𝐿𝑡+1 , 
 
where 𝛿 is the discount factor and 𝐿𝑡  is the loss function at period t. In specifying the 
function, the model follows Srinivasan et al. (2008) whose function captures asymmetric 
preference on exchange rate. Many studies show that emerging market economies have a 
fear of appreciation (Calvo & Reinhart 2002; Levy-Yayati & Surzenegger 2007). Pontines 
and Rajan (2011) provide evidence of asymmetric preference on exchange rate depreciation 
as opposed to appreciation, in India, Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Indonesia. In this regard, the monetary reaction function is: 
 
𝐿𝑡+1 =
1
2
(𝑅𝑡+1 − 𝑅
∗)2 +
𝛽
2
 (𝑒𝑡+1 − 𝑒
∗)2 +
𝛾
3
(𝑒𝑡+1 − 𝑒
∗)3 ,       (7) 
 
where 𝛽 > 0 is the relative weight and 𝛾 is the asymmetric preference parameter on 
exchange rate depreciation. Here, 𝑅∗ and 𝑒∗ are the optimal level of foreign reserves and 
target exchange rate, respectively. The reaction function is expressed in period t+1 because 
we later assume that exchange rate at period t is the central bank‟s target rate. The loss 
function departs from the standard quadratic form in that policy makers are allowed to treat 
differently the rate of appreciating and depreciating pressure. It should be noted that if γ=0, 
the loss function becomes symmetric.  If γ>0, eq.13 implies that the rate of appreciation is 
weighted more heavily than the rate of depreciation in the loss function. In other words, if 
∂Lt+1
∂et+1
= β (et+1 − e
∗) + γ
2
(et+1 − e
∗)2 > 0, then exchange rate appreciation would 
increase the policymaker‟s loss.  
 
Basically, a central bank provides liquidity by selling its foreign reserves. Since this study 
takes into account a central bank‟s motives for foreign exchange market intervention, it is 
assumed that exchange rate depreciation/appreciation can be reduced by the central bank‟s 
intervention. That is,  
 
𝑒𝑡+1 − 𝑒
∗ = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝜖𝑡+1,              (8) 
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where 𝑎1 > 0 and 𝜖𝑡+1 is the error term with a zero mean and a variance 𝜎𝜖
2. Eq.8 implies 
that pressure on exchange rate depreciation would deplete foreign reserves, whereas 
appreciation would result in more foreign reserve accumulation because of central bank 
intervention. Indeed, for emerging economies with a thin domestic bond market and a 
shallow financial system, there may be no practical short-run means of managing the 
exchange rate other than through reserves sales. 
 
Minimizing eq.7 subject to eq.8 leads to the following intervention reaction function of the 
central bank: 
 𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑅
∗ +
𝛽
2
𝐸𝑡 2𝑎1 𝑒𝑡+1 − 𝑒
∗ + 𝛾𝑎1 𝑒𝑡+1 − 𝑒
∗ 2 .         (9) 
 
Suppose that a central bank‟s optimal level of reserves is equal to the net liquidity demand 
in period t as expressed in eq.6. In other words, given the economic fundamentals and with 
an underdeveloped financial market, the central bank would hold the necessary 
precautionary reserves to supply additional liquidity by selling R in foreign reserves, which 
is measured in foreign currency. The optimal level of reserves for the economy‟s central 
bank in period t is then given by: 
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R
     (10) 
Also, we assume that exchange rate in period t is the target exchange rate aimed by the 
central bank, i.e.  𝑒𝑡 = 𝑒
∗. Thus, eq. 9 can be transformed as: 
 
 𝑅𝑡+1 =  1 − 𝜆𝑡 
𝑙𝑡
2𝜖 
𝑒𝑡  𝜖 +
𝑒𝑡
𝛼
− 𝜃 +
𝛽
2
𝐸𝑡 2𝑎1 Δ𝑒𝑡 + 𝛾𝑎1 Δ𝑒𝑡 
2 .             (11) 
 
 
Eq.11 indicates that reserve accumulation is influenced by the expected liquidity demand, 
the fundamentals of the economies, the central bank‟s target exchange rate, its preference 
on exchange rate fluctuations, and the level of financial development.  
 
6.4 Financial development and foreign reserve accumulation 
 
Eq.10 and eq.11 provide an interesting framework to understand the behavior of foreign 
reserve accumulation in emerging market economies. First, eq. 10 suggests that if a country 
has a perfect financial market to coordinate full private supply of liquidity (𝜆𝑡 = 1), the 
optimal foreign reserves would be 0. On the contrary, if the domestic financial market is at 
a very low level (𝜆𝑡 = 0), then the central bank needs to hold a full optimal level of foreign 
reserves, 
𝑅∗
𝑒𝑡
=
𝑙
2𝜖
(𝜖 +
𝑒𝑡
𝛼
− ∅), which is equivalent to the optimal level of foreign reserves 
in Obstfeld et al. (2010). However, the level of financial development in emerging market 
economies is usually neither perfect nor zero, i.e. 0 < 𝜆𝑡 < 1. In short, if the capacity of the 
financial market is high (high value of λ), then pressure on the currency would be smaller 
(small net liquidity demand), which requires less government intervention. 
 
Eq.11 is the actual level of foreign reserves and consists of two terms. The first term is the 
optimal level of foreign reserves while the second term is the central bank‟s expectation of 
exchange rate deviation from its target rate. Eq.11 partly explains why actual foreign 
27 
  
reserve levels in emerging countries with a preference for exchange rate depreciation or 
stability is higher than the optimal level of foreign reserves, often discussed in the 
literature. 
 
Overall, eq.11 implies that domestic financial sector development would help reduce a 
central bank‟s necessity to accumulate foreign reserves for liquidity supply. This argument 
is supported by taking first derivatives of (11) with respect to λ and l, which yields: 
𝜕𝑅𝑡+1
𝜕𝜆𝑡
= −
𝑙𝑡
2𝜖 
𝑒𝑡  𝜖 +
𝑒𝑡
𝛼
− 𝜃 ≤ 0    (12) 
 
 𝜕𝑅𝑡+1
𝜕𝑙𝑡
=  1 − 𝜆𝑡 
𝑒𝑡
2𝜖 
 𝜖 +
𝑒𝑡
𝛼
− 𝜃 ≥ 0    (13) 
 
𝜕𝑅𝑡+1
𝜕(𝜆𝑡 𝑙𝑡)
= −
1
2𝜖 
𝑒𝑡  𝜖 +
𝑒𝑡
𝛼
− 𝜃 ≤ 0                         (14) 
 
Eq.12 implies that a high level of financial sector development would correspond to a lower 
actual level of foreign reserve accumulation.  Similarly, eq. 13 implies that an increase in 
potential liquidity demand would lead to an increase in foreign reserves, to forestall output 
loss caused by liquidity shocks. The size of the change in foreign reserves, however, 
depends on the ability of the financial sector to coordinate the private supply of liquidity.  
 
Suppose there is a bad realization of   which causes a liquidity shock, and therefore 
pressure on the home currency as people liquidate their asset to speculate in foreign 
exchange. With an underdeveloped financial market which cannot fully coordinate to meet 
full liquidity demand, the monetary authority will then exercise its lender of last resort role 
by using its reserves to moderate the exchange rate fall. This is motivated by a central 
bank‟s desire to limit exchange rate volatility and avoid a currency crisis.  Nevertheless, 
with a huge liquidity demand shock, pressure on the exchange rate will be greater and 
require a bigger intervention if the economy‟s financial development is low.  
 
Similarly, if there is upward pressure on the exchange rate as a result of capital inflows, the 
monetary authority with a preference for exchange rate stability would intervene by buying 
foreign currency and end up with foreign reserve accumulation. If the financial sector is 
developed enough to efficiently allocate resources to productive investments rather than to 
consumption, or to efficiently intermediate capital outflows to offset inflows, then 
intervention in the foreign exchange market by the central bank becomes less necessary.  
Less intervention should partly reduce a central bank‟s motivation to hoard reserves.  
 
The model provides implications, not only for a central bank‟s liquidity provision, but also 
for active management of liquidity by a central bank that values macroeconomic and 
financial stability. Simply, the role of states in easing illiquidity and providing liquidity, 
increases when financial markets are underdeveloped and cannot fully guarantee liquidity 
during shocks. In other words, an open economy with less developed financial markets is 
expected to accumulate more reserves to ensure liquidity, while limiting the exchange rate 
and macroeconomic volatility. This implies that motivation to hoard reserves could be 
mitigated partly by developing a deep financial sector. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This study empirically examined the relationship between capital flows, level of foreign 
reserves and financial development. Applying fixed-effect and simple pooled regressions 
with annual data from 12 East Asian economies between 1980 and 2009, the empirical 
results suggest that financial development can reduce a central bank‟s motivation to hoard 
foreign reserves by reducing the impact of capital flows on foreign reserve demand. This 
study also used alternative measures of financial development to check the robustness of 
the estimations. The results consistently suggest that financial sector development reduces a 
central bank‟s motivation to hoard reserves.  
 
Motivated by the empirical results, this study constructed a model in which a state with 
asymmetric preference on exchange rate holds reserves to supply foreign exchange 
liquidity in underdeveloped capital markets. The theoretical argument is that with a low 
capacity of the private sector to meet liquidity demand due to underdeveloped financial 
markets, the state plays a role in supplying additional liquidity. Therefore, in this model, 
development of the financial system would reduce the monetary authority‟s motivation to 
hoard reserves for liquidity provision. In addition, asymmetric preference in the exchange 
rate partly explains why the actual level of foreign reserves held by a central bank is usually 
higher than the necessary optimal level of foreign reserves needed for liquidity supply. 
 
The paper has discussed the motives and examined the role of underdeveloped capital 
markets in foreign reserve accumulation in emerging market economies. Serious 
assessment of the adequacy of reserve holding in emerging market economies is left to 
future research. In addition, further research could focus on the role of financial 
development at the regional level, including bond market development and regional 
monetary cooperation, which would reduce the need for unilateral reserve hoarding.   
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Appendix  
 
Appendix A: List of economies in the sample 
China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan,  Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam. 
 
Appendix B: List of variables, definition, and data sources 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Log(GDPPC)  GDP per capita World Development Indicators 
(accessed January 2011) 
Log(M2/GDP)  M2 over GDP World Development Indicators 
(accessed January 2011) 
Log(trade/GDP) Exports plus imports over GDP World Development Indicators 
(accessed January 2011) 
Exchange Rate 
Fluctuation 
Annual standard deviation of 
monthly change in exchange rate 
Author‟s calculation based on 
exchange rate from IFS, IMF. 
(accessed January 2011) 
Capital Inflows 
(Hot money) 
The sum of current account and net 
FDI inflows over GDP.  
Calculation based on data from 
IFS, IMF. 
(accessed January 2011) 
Financial 
Development 1 
Domestic Credit to private plus 
market capitalization over GDP 
Calculation based on data from 
World Bank 
(accessed January 2011) 
Financial 
Development 2 
Total equity liability+ total debt 
liability over GDP 
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
2007). Updated till 2009 
(accessed January 2011) 
Financial 
Development 3 
Market capitalization over GDP World Development Indicators 
(accessed on January 2011) 
Financial 
Development  4 
Total Stock Value traded over 
GDP 
World Development Indicators 
(accessed January 2011) 
Financial 
Openness 
Chinn-Ito Index (2009) http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-
Ito_website.htm 
(accessed February 2011) 
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Appendix C: summary statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log(Reserves/GDP) 334 2.673 1.150 -0.724 4.799 
logGDPPC 359 7.914 1.574 4.576 10.645 
Log(M2/GDP) 339 4.302 0.670 2.065 5.490 
Log(Trade/GDP) 353 4.336 0.882 2.514 6.082 
FX Volatility 359 0.025 0.070 0.000 0.835 
Financial Openness 355 0.691 1.605 -1.844 2.478 
Capital Inflows 358 0.051 0.095 -0.086 0.469 
Financial Openness  340 0.775 0.975 0.000 5. 299 
Capitalization/GDP 251 0.917 0.941 0.003 6.170 
Stock value traded/GDP 252 0.623 0.868 0.000 7.558 
Financial Development 242 2.099 1.347 0. 290 7.416 
 
 
 
 
 
 
